ABSTRACT of Paper read on 16th January, 1950 Philosophy is knowledge gained by the analysis of knowledge, or by the re-synthesis of the products of such analysis. Knowledge is derived by two processes, perception of externality, and introspection.
to admit the tentative nature of scientific hypotheses. Sciences should be taught inductively, i.e., with reference to the history of the mental processes and environments of its founders. Most hypotheses are private in origin but democratic in acceptance. The category of truth or falsity does not apply to hypotheses. It is therefore a fallacy to assume that all propositions must either be true or be false. In respect of truth and falsity there are (at least) the following classes of propositions.
1. Propositions about empirical public facts. A further appeal to experience can demonstrate the truth of these.
2. Propositions about historic facts whose truth is decided by the consensus of historical opinion.
3. Propositions about legal facts whose truth is decided by a court of law. 4. Propositions about private facts. As to the truth of these the individual is the sole judge.
5. Hypothetical propositions. These are all based on analogy and are therefore neither true nor untrue. They are either more or less convenient for the purpose in hand. Mathematical and geometric propositions belong here too, for metrical mathematics judges usefulness by the mutual consistency of statements made within a given conventional system, while geometric propositions are based on axioms and postulates the reliability of which is finally tested by experience.
Quantum Theory and Logic

BY DE. M. D. H. STRAUSS ABSTRACT of Paper read on 20th February, 1950
The continued discussion about the so-called logical problems of quantum theory (QT) [cf., e.g., Reichenbach's book, recent issues of Dialectica and Philosophy of Science] is due to the absence of a recognized physical axiomatics to which these problems could be referred for settlement. The failure of various attempts to re-construct QT on the basis of simple physical postulates is a sign that a complete understanding of QT has not yet been achieved, or else that something entirely new is involved in such a reconstruction.
The reconstruction of the basic features of mathematical QT, carried out in 1936 by Dr. Strauss, § is based on what may be described as a translation of Bohr's conception of complementarity into the language of logical syntax where it gives rise to a new " logic " characterized by restricted sentential conneetability. The main contentions of Dr. Strauss' lecture were (i) that this complementarity logic is absolutely essential in any rational reconstruction of QT, and (ii) that it accounts for the most general features of our experience in the field of quantum physics in exactly the same sense in which nonEuclidean geometry accounts for the basic feature of gravitation, i.e. the equivalence of gravitation and acceleration, or in which the Lorentz-transformation acdounts for the basic fact in kinematics, viz., the existence of a finite limiting velocity.
The " most general feature of quantum physical experience " may be extracted either from an analysis of QT itself or from that of typical quantum phenomena. It consists (i) in the statistical character of all well-defined predictions, and (ii) in the relationship of general complementarity which holds between the results of any two actual measurements or observations (other than those of a constant quantity), and which may be stated thus : the results
